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1. Introduction 
 
Independent auditing is an essential ele-
ment of corporate governance (the Cad-
bury report, 1992; EC Green paper, 
1996, OECD, 2004, etc.). In order for 
shareholders to be able to check and 
control managers’ behaviors, independ-
ent auditing is report to shareholders on 
audited financial statements. In doing so, 
independent auditors can act in the inter-
ests to shareholders. In this context, in-
dependent auditing is essential to corpo-
rate governance. However, we nowadays 
can no longer accept uncritically such 
the discussion of the relationship be-
tween corporate governance and inde-
pendent auditing from shareholders’ per-
spective. 
 
With corporate globalization and the IT 
revolution accelerating, and with corpo-
rate misdeeds and scandals1 more fre-
quent, greater attention has been focused 
on Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) in recent years. Especially, many 
recent corporate misdeeds and scandals 
have resulted in loss of public trust in 
corporations and a growing sense of un-
certainty among people. For example, 
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according to a worldwide survey of 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2003), 52 % 
of the CEOs interviewed answered that 
public trust in corporations has declined 
as a result of corporate misdeeds and 
scandals. In addition, in Japan, accord-
ing to a questionnaire survey of Japan 
Institute of Social and Economic Affair 
(Keizai Koho Center) (2007), 51% of 
Japanese livers answered that corpora-
tions need to establish corporate ethics 
and prevent corporate misdeeds and 
scandals in order to gain public trust. 
These indicate that a lot of people share 
awareness of the issues of corporate mis-
deeds and scandals. Rebuilding the pub-
lic trust they have lost is their prime task 
at the moment.  
 
Under such circumstances, the issue of 
CSR needs to be discussed in terms of 
what benefits corporations bring to soci-
ety in the 21st century and for whom they 
exist2. CSR can be defined as efforts 
aimed at realizing sustained corporate 
value-creation and a better society 
through the erection of mechanisms for 
synergetic development of corporations 
and society (Japan Association of Cor-
porate Executives, 2003, p.7)3. CSR has 
an effect on the conventional views of 
how corporations and society should be. 
This requires reconsideration of the rela-
tionship between corporations and soci-
ety in the discussion of today’s CSR. 
The today’s discussion of this relation-
ship regards the relationship between 
corporations and society not as the rela-
tionship between corporations and share-
holders but as the relationship between 
corporations and stakeholders, and 
places great importance on the relation-
ship with stakeholders. The relationship 
between corporations and society can 
influence the views of corporations and 
others. 
 
In addition, CSR also has an impact on 
independent auditing, because the con-
cept of independent auditing has been 
changing over time as people’s views of 
corporations and society change. Inde-
pendent auditing is a social institution 
that is loosely linked with society 
through interaction. We need to redefine 
the monitoring and check system of cor-
porations to rebuild public trust in the 
today’s discussion of the relationship 
between corporations and society. 
 
This paper clarifies a new perspective on 
relationship between corporate govern-
ance and independent auditing, and reex-
amines the contribution of independent 
auditing to corporate governance 
1
 In these years, more fraud by organizations than fraud 
by individuals increases. In other words, the cases of 
fraud and illegal acts which are rooted in corporate 
culture and ethics increase. We should be fully aware of 
the seriousness of the issues which are managers’ inade-
quate understanding and reaction against their cases, or 
managers’ active involvement in their cases. See Kuri-
hama (2005).  
2
 When considering CSR, it is necessary to strike a 
balance between economic, social, and environmental 
aspects (the triple bottom line) of CSR. Which aspect 
should be given priority is less important (Japan Asso-
ciation of Corporate Executives, 2003). Each corpora-
tion is now under pressure to balance the above three 
aspects. Furthermore, the new corporate investment of 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) has an impact on 
the market as well as corporations. SRI represents in-
vestors’ efforts to systematically evaluate corporations 
in terms not only of their economic aspects but also of 
their social and environmental aspects while making full 
use of market mechanisms. At the same time, there is a 
trend on the market side that, instead of emphasizing 
economic efficiency, market includes the social and 
environmental aspects when evaluating corporations. In 
response to these changes, the way of evaluating corpo-
rate value is also changing. This paper focuses on the 
negative aspects of CSR (CSR basically has two aspects: 
positive aspect and negative aspect) although the triple 
bottom line is very important in the discussion of 
CSR .Because these aspects lead to dual functions of 
corporate governance which this paper discusses. In the 
future, it is necessary to examine the relationship be-
tween sustainability accounting and auditing. See 
Elkington (1998) and GRI reporting guidelines (2002; 
2006) for details about the triple bottom line , and Kuri-
hama (2007) for details about the dual aspects of CSR. 
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through the discussion of the relation-
ship between corporations and society as 
recently brought up concerning CSR. 
This is necessary in order to understand 
the concept of society, corporations and 
auditing today, and to think the view of 
how corporations and independent audit-
ing should be toward rebuilding public 
trust. 
 
This paper is structured as follow. Sec-
tion 2 examines changing corporate gov-
ernance view through the discussion of 
today’s CSR Section 3 reexamines the 
relationship between corporate govern-
ance and independent auditing. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
 
2.  Changing corporate governance 
view 
 
2.1 Dual functions of Corporate Gov-
ernance 
 
Today’s corporate governance is a sys-
tem designed to ensure sustained corpo-
rate growth and development, proper 
decision-making on management poli-
cies based on the implementation of 
more efficient and better management, 
and the appropriate supervision, evalua-
tion and motivation of managers in the 
execution of their businesses (Japan As-
sociation of Corporate Executives, 2003, 
p.50).There are two requirements that 
must be met if a corporation is to fulfill 
its social responsibility while also im-
proving its competitive position (ibid, 
p.50). First, it must establish certain 
principles which define the general di-
rection that it will take. Second, it must 
develop a system to ensure the imple-
mentation of these principles at all 
times; in other words, it must establish a 
system of corporate governance.  
Although corporate governance varies 
depending on the country, region, and 
corporation, it basically has two func-
tions4: the positive function and the 
negative function. 
 
The positive function is something that 
enhances corporate competitiveness. 
Corporate governance can enhance cor-
porate competitiveness through proper 
decision-making on management poli-
cies based on the implementation of 
more efficient and better management. 
This is the positive function of corporate 
governance. 
 
On the other hand, the negative function 
is something that prevents corporate 
misdeeds and scandals. Corporate gov-
ernance can prevent corporate misdeeds 
and scandals through the appropriate 
supervision and evaluation of managers 
in the execution of their businesses. This 
is the negative function of corporate 
governance. 
 
Corporate governance is said to be vol-
untary and autonomous initiatives of 
corporations although it is legally de-
fined. In corporate governance, both the 
positive and negative functions are 
equally important. However, the positive 
function of corporate governance cannot 
be fulfilled without being able to fulfill 
the negative function. No matter how 
each corporation fulfills the positive 
function, it will lose public trust unless it 
fulfills the negative function, thus de-
creasing the significance of corporate 
governance itself. In order for a corpora-
tion to build and maintain the relation-
ship of trust with society, emphasis 
should be placed on “what needs to be 
done to work things out” or “minimum 
4
 In CSR, this leads to both the positive aspect and the 
negative aspect.  
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things to do” rather than on “what to do 
to be successful.5” 
 
Therefore, fulfilling the negative func-
tion of corporate governance is a mini-
mum requirement for corporations to 
maintain the relationship of trust with 
society in the discussion of today’s CSR. 
There have been numerous cases6 in 
which corporations have lost public trust 
because they cannot fulfill the negative 
function. It may be possible to distin-
guish the positive function as a volun-
tary one from the negative function 
which is mandatory. In other words, the 
negative function of corporate govern-
ance is a necessary condition while the 
positive function is a sufficient condi-
tion. Corporate governance is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for corpora-
tions to be trusted by society. 
 
We need to understand that each corpo-
ration must fulfill the negative function 
of corporate governance first in order to 
restore public trust although it may be 
insufficient for today’s corporate gov-
ernance.  
 
2.2 Relationship between and corpo-
rations and shareholders7: Corpora-
tions and Society 
 
In recent discussions on corporate gov-
ernance, the mainstream view is that of 
maximizing shareholder value. It is 
widely thought that corporations exist to 
maximize shareholder value. 
 
As is well known, Milton Friedman 
viewed the corporations in a free market 
as follows: 
“There is one and only one social 
responsibility of business – to use 
its resources and engage in activi-
ties designed to increase its profits 
so long as it stays within the rules 
of the game, which is to say, en-
gages in open and free competition 
without deception or fraud” (1962, 
p.133) 
 
In Friedman’s view (1962; 1970), CSR 
is to increase profits for shareholders, 
and corporate value is mainly measured 
by economic efficiency. Specifically, 
CSR means to increase profits by pro-
ducing and selling quality products and/
or services, while also paying as large 
amounts of taxes as possible, which in 
turn enrich the government and other 
stakeholders. If the managers8 attempted 
to fulfill their responsibility for other 
stakeholders rather than the sharehold-
ers, it would disrupt the free market sys-
tem. This view affects a basic view to 
the present in many corporations. There-
fore, each corporation places greater 
emphasis on the relationship with share-
holders and bears social responsibilities 
toward them. In this context, corporate 
governance also means to maximize 
shareholder value. 
 
Why do corporations place great empha-
sis on the relationship with sharehold-
ers? To answer this question, there is a 
neoclassical theory on the profit-
maximizing principle of corporations. 
That is, a corporation is a kind of private 
5
 From the standpoint of social evolution or institutional 
evolution, we can learn from history not because there 
are those who survived or succeeded but because there 
are those who could not survive or failed. This is under-
standable from the historical repetition of corporate 
misdeeds and scandals. The history of corporate mis-
deeds repeats itself. 
6
 For examples, the recent cases of Enron and World-
Com in the U.S.A, Royal Ahold in Holland, Parmalat in 
Italy, Kanebo, Livedoor, Nikko Cordial Securities in 
Japan and others. 
7   The discussion here is based on Friedman (1962, 
1970).  
8 This paper uses the term “managers” to designate both 
directors and officers (management, corporate execu-
tives etc.).  
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property owned by its shareholders, 
whose agents are the managers of the 
corporation. Therefore, their only re-
sponsibility is to maximize profits for 
the shareholders.  
 
Even today, maximizing shareholder 
value leads to the improvement of cor-
porate value, and ultimately to the en-
richment of society as a whole. The rela-
tionship between the corporation and 
society can be reduced to the relation-
ship between corporation (especially, 
managers) and shareholders. This view 
is mainly discussed regarding corporate 
governance in the U.S. However, we 
nowadays can no longer accept uncriti-
cally such the view of corporate govern-
ance. 
 
2.3 Relationship between and corpo-
rations and stakeholders: Corpora-
tions and Society 
 
Corporations are social institutions or 
public institutions of society in that they 
are recognized and approved by society. 
This view differs from the position that 
corporations exist to maximize share-
holder value. If corporations were re-
garded as public institutions of society, 
it would be necessary to reconsider the 
conventional relationship between cor-
porations and society. Accordingly, it 
would be necessary for each corporation 
to switch its focus from the relationship 
with its shareholders to the relationship 
with its stakeholders where the share-
holders are regarded as part of the stake-
holders (Freeman, 1983; Freeman and 
Reed, 1983; Donaldson and Preston, 
1995; Evan and Freeman, 1998; etc.). 
 
The scope of the stakeholder is either 
narrow or broad (Freeman and Reed, 
1983, p.91). In the narrow sense, stake-
holders are any identifiable group or 
individuals on whom the organization is 
dependent for its continued survival. In 
the broad sense, they are any identifiable 
group or individuals who can affect the 
achievement of an organization’s objec-
tives or who are affected by the achieve-
ment of an organization’s objectives. 
 
Today’s CSR places great importance on 
the relationship with stakeholders, re-
garding the relationship between corpo-
rations and society as the relationship 
between corporations and stakeholders, 
with many of the discussions based on 
the broad sense of stakeholders. Not 
only shareholders but also stakeholders 
in the broad sense who provide the envi-
ronment for corporate activities are, in a 
way, capital suppliers for the corporation 
(Schlossberger, 1994). Stakeholders in 
the broad sense bear some risk by being 
involved in corporate activities, even 
though the stakes vary from stakeholder 
to stakeholder (Clarkson, 1998). Stake-
holders in the broad sense entrust the 
management of a corporation to the 
managers. In fact, most recent reports on 
CSR and corporate governance regard 
the relationship between corporations 
and society as the relationship between 
corporations and stakeholders in the 
broad sense. Thus, it can be concluded 
that corporations as public institutions of 
society bear social responsibilities to-
ward the stakeholders in the broad sense 
(hereafter called stakeholders). 
 
Therefore, corporations have to establish 
corporate governance with more empha-
sis on the relationship with its stake-
holders. Corporate governance is whole 
management, and is associated with the 
integrity of management. This is related 
to corporate philosophy, corporate cul-
ture, and corporate ethics, and obviously 
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to the integrity of managers and/or man-
agers’ fiduciary duties. Today, each cor-
poration needs to redefine exactly the 
view of corporation should be and the 
monitoring and check system of corpo-
ration in order to rebuild public trust. 
For example, each corporation needs to 
establish stakeholder engagement or 
stakeholder management, corporate phi-
losophy and culture, management sys-
tem, internal control system, risk man-
agement system, compliance system, the 
system of discloser and accountability, 
auditing system and others as integrant 
and element parts in the establishment of 
the system of corporate governance de-
signed to ensure the implementation of 
CSR. In doing so, the commitment of 
managers and the monitoring and check 
of managers’ decision-making and be-
haviors is very important. 
 
A big issue is the system of corporate 
governance becomes a mere façade. It is 
very important that each corporation 
needs to constantly improve the system 
of corporate governance from stake-
holders’ perspective according to the 
changes in the times and society with a 
full understanding of the core concept of 
corporate governance designed to ensure 
the implementation of CSR (so-called 
Japanese ‘Kaizen’). 
 
Consequently, we need to think the core 
concept of corporate governance based 
on the viewpoints of stakeholders in fol-
lowing sections 2.4. 
 
2.4  From agency relationship to fidu-
ciary relationship: the core of corpo-
rate governance10 
 
All corporations are a legal person. 
Therefore, they require someone 
(representative organ) who (which) will 
make decisions on the corporation’s be-
half and be responsible for managing the 
corporation. 
 
For whom do managers manage the cor-
poration and to whom are they responsi-
ble? 
 
It is commonly thought that managers 
are shareholders’ agents based on agency 
contracts and are only responsible to the 
shareholders. Corporations are regarded 
as simply legal fiction that serves as a 
nexus for a set of contracting relations 
among individuals (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976, p.310)11 . It is also viewed as a 
kind of private property. This is based on 
the corporate view discussed in contrac-
tual theory and/or agency theory, where 
managers make a contract with share-
holders who own the corporation. Under 
such view, the relationship between 
shareholders as principles and managers 
as agents are an agency relationship be-
cause a contractual relationship can be 
regarded as an agency relationship be-
tween principals and agents (ibid). 
Therefore, managers are expected to 
efficiently manage the corporation as an 
agent of the shareholders in order to 
maximize profits for them12. Managers 
need to act in the interest to sharehold-
ers. In this context, if the manager were 
to behave against the shareholders’ will, 
such a behavior would be regarded as 
inappropriate, and would therefore con-
stitute a breach of contract. 
 
In the conventional discussion of corpo-
rate governance, the issue of governance 
for managers is to design incentives to 
10   See Kurihama (2007) for details. 
11
 The discussion on contractual or agency theory is 
based on Jensen and Meckling (1976), Frankel (1983), 
Hodgson (1988), Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), Iwai 
(1999, 2002), and Kurihama (2007).  
12  This view is a common belief (Maitland, 1991).  
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ensure managers as agents behave prop-
erly toward shareholders. The best ex-
ample of such incentives is stock options 
as rewards for the managers.  
 
However, corporations are not private 
entities based on contracts with indi-
viduals. Since managers are not the 
agents of shareholders, it is very difficult 
to discuss the governance of managers 
based on contractual and/or agency rela-
tionship (Iwai, 2002). In reality, there is 
no agency relationship between share-
holders and managers, and managers are 
not shareholder’ agents (Boartright, 
1994).13  
 
Corporations are public institutions of 
society. The social responsibilities as 
well as sustainability of corporations are 
the greatest concerns of society. Corpo-
rate misdeeds, scandals, and subsequent 
bankruptcy have an enormous impact on 
public trust because they may lead to 
unemployment, economic damage, fi-
nancial shock, the collapse of existing 
business channels, and social confusion 
(Drucker, 1950).14 These facts indicate 
that managers do not act on behalf of the 
shareholders alone, and that the relation-
ship between corporations and society 
cannot be reduced to the agency rela-
tionship between managers and share-
holders. Even though the relationship 
between managers and shareholders is 
the agency relationship, a certain amount 
of work must be entrusted to managers 
based on the principle of mutual trust as 
long as there is a wide gap in informa-
tion, knowledge and capability between 
them (Frankle, 1983; Higuchi, 1999; 
Iwai, 1999; 2002).  
If managers are not the agents of share-
holders, for what purpose do they exist, 
and to whom do they owe what obliga-
tion? 
 
Managers are the corporation’s 
“fiduciaries”15. Fiduciaries are those 
who have been entrusted by others to 
perform certain duties on their behalf. A 
fiduciary relationship is, by nature, an 
unequal relationship built between two 
parties or individuals who cannot build 
an agency relationship, or either of 
whom bears a greater risk by making a 
formal contract. In other words, a fiduci-
ary relationship is built among individu-
als and cannot be reduced to an agency 
relationship. Therefore, the concept of a 
fiduciary relationship is essentially dif-
ferent from that of an agency relation-
ship. 
 
In fact, corporations as public institu-
tions of society place great importance 
on the relationship with society or stake-
holders. Stakeholders entrust the man-
agement of the corporation to its manag-
ers because there is a wide gap in infor-
mation, knowledge and capability be-
tween stakeholders and managers. This 
is the fiduciary relationship between 
managers and stakeholders which is dif-
ferent from the agency relationship. In 
the relationship between corporations 
and society, greater emphasis is placed 
on such a fiduciary relationship. Manag-
ers need to act in the interests to stake-
holders. 
 
It is very important for managers to ful-
fill their fiduciary duties in order to 
maintain the fiduciary relationship. Fi-
duciary duties are the duties that have 
13
  In addition, according to Aoki (2001), there may be a 
lot of situations in which governance by shareholders is 
not either effective or efficient.  
14
  Clarkson (1998) defines the corporation not as a 
nexus of contracts but as a nexus of risks.  
15
 The discussion on fiduciaries is based on Frankel 
(1983), Boartright (1994), Higuchi (1999), Iwai (1999, 
2002), and Kurihama (2007).  
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been entrusted to someone to perform 
only for the entrusters. Of the fiduciary 
duties, the most fundamental ones are 
“the duty of loyalty,” “the duty of care,” 
and “accountability.” The duty of loyalty 
requires fiduciaries to loyally perform 
their duties only for the entrusters’ inter-
ests rather than their own. The duty of 
care requires fiduciaries to perform their 
duties with proper care even if perform-
ing such duties is not beneficial to them. 
Accountability requires fiduciaries to 
explain business details to the entrusters. 
Of course providing information is not 
enough in it. These three impose some 
sort of integrity and ethics on them. To-
day’s cases of corporate misdeeds and 
scandals16 are excellent examples of 
managers who disregarded their fiduci-
ary duties17. 
 
Corporations bear social responsibilities 
toward stakeholders while managers are 
the fiduciaries of corporations. There-
fore, the managers have fiduciary duties 
toward the stakeholders. Fulfilling fidu-
ciary duties is essential if managers are 
to gain the trust of society. These fiduci-
ary duties are the core of corporate gov-
ernance designed to ensure the imple-
mentation of CSR. Corporate govern-
ance is one of their initiatives to restore 
trust and confidence. In order to achieve 
this, corporations must at least fulfill the 
negative function of corporate govern-
ance. In order for corporations to fulfill 
CSR and for them to be trusted by soci-
ety, the managers must not only fulfill 
fiduciary duties, but also be checked 
about whether they are performing such 
duties appropriately. Because human 
integrity and ethics are a scarce re-
source, and therefore the behavior of 
managers must be monitored in order to 
maintain the fiduciary relationship. 
 
Furthermore, in order to maintain the 
fiduciary relationship, some form of 
public intervention by judicial organiza-
tions or others is essential. This is be-
cause the fiduciary relationship includes 
the problem that managers hold a dele-
gated power that is susceptible to abuse 
(Frankle, 1983). Actually, the “duty of 
loyalty”, “the due of care”, and 
“accountability”, which are the most 
fundamental ones of fiduciary duties, are 
also legally defined. Public intervention 
is regarded as necessary and is imple-
mented in actual governance.  
 
 
3.  Corporate Governance and Audit-
ing; a new perspective 
 
3.1 Conventional view of role for inde-
pendent auditing in corporate govern-
ance 
 
Contractual or agency theory provides 
an effective approach to independent 
auditing studies. A lot of studies based 
on this corporate view are being con-
ducted (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Wal-
lace, 1980; DeAngelo, 1981; Antle, 
1982; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983, 1986; 
Sunder, 1997, etc.). Many conventional 
view of independent auditing is designed 
based on this theory18. 
 
As explained in section 2.4, an agency 
relationship assumes both shareholders 
16
   See notes 8 regarding today’s case. 
17
 As stated above in introduction, a lot of Japanese 
livers (62%) answered that managers need to build 
sound ethics and to comply with laws, regulations, 
social norms and others. 
There is also the conventional view of independent 
auditing based on free markets (efficient market hy-
pothesis) (AAA, 1973; Wallace, 1980, Watts and Zim-
merman, 1986 etc). Since the discussion here focuses 
on the relationship between corporate governance and 
auditing, this view is omitted. The conventional view of 
independent auditing based on contractual and/or 
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as principals and managers as agents to 
be rational economic men who do their 
best to maximize their self-interest. 
However, an asymmetry of information 
exists between shareholders and manag-
ers. Therefore, a moral hazard arises, 
namely that the managers are more 
likely to behave opportunistically, know-
ing that the shareholders have only im-
perfect information about the managers’ 
behaviors. Agency costs may also arise 
inevitably to avoid loss from the moral 
hazard. Because there is such a potential 
conflict between shareholders and man-
agers, greater attention should be fo-
cused on the issue of governance, or 
how managers’ behaviors should be 
monitored and controlled19. 
 
In order for shareholders to check and 
control managers’ behaviors, informa-
tion disclosure or financial statements 
need to be provided to the shareholders. 
Armed with such information, share-
holders can effectively monitor and con-
trol the managers’ behaviors. However, 
such financial statements may be inaccu-
rate, or falsified intentionally by the 
managers. It is virtually impossible for 
the shareholders to directly check the 
credibility of financial statements. When 
the managers provide financial state-
ments, they are most likely to agree to 
provide evidence that the information 
has been carefully prepared to avoid ac-
cidental errors and has been free of in-
tentional manipulation (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Wallace, 1980)20. 
Therefore, independent auditing is nec-
essary to support the good agency rela-
tionship between managers and share-
holders by enhancing the credibility of 
financial statements. Independent audit-
ing serves to reduce agency costs which 
inevitably arise from the agency rela-
tionship between managers and share-
holders. In doing so, shareholders can 
check and control managers’ behaviors, 
and therefore independent auditing can 
contribute to shareholders. 
 
Independent auditing partially performs 
the function of governing managers for 
shareholders by monitoring and control-
ling their behaviors in corporate activi-
ties to enhance the credibility of finan-
cial statements (Lee, 1993). It plays an 
important role in facilitating the building 
of the agency relationship (Sunder, 
1997). In this context, independent au-
diting is essential to corporations as a 
nexus for a set of contracting relations 
among individuals (Jensen, 1983). This 
is the conventional perspective on the 
relationship between corporate govern-
ance and independent auditing. Of 
course, this perspective is closely related 
to the objective and inherent limitation 
of independent auditing and the scope of 
auditors’ responsibility. However, by 
changing corporate view, we nowadays 
can no longer accept uncritically such 
the conventional view of independent 
auditing. 
 
3.2 Contribution of independent au-
diting to corporate governance 
 
As sated above, inappropriate corporate 
management itself may cause a corpora-
tion to lose public trust. Therefore, each 
corporation needs to redefine its corpo-
rate ethics and monitoring and check 
20 In this theory, shareholders as rational economic men 
can maximize their profits and control managers if they 
can trust and utilize financial statements. Therefore, the 
managers ask for independent auditing.  
agency theory and the one based on free markets are the 
same in that both seek to enhance the credibility of 
financial information. In addition, both views assume 
that the primary users of independent auditor’s report are 
shareholders. 
19 As stated above in 2.4, the governance of managers 
also includes incentive contracts such as bonuses and 
stock options.  
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system to rebuild public trust. 
 
In gaining the trust of society, each cor-
poration must at least prevent corporate 
misdeeds and scandals. To fulfill the 
negative function of corporate govern-
ance, each corporation needs to 
strengthen corporate governance with a 
full understanding of the core of corpo-
rate governance. Thus, the system by 
which managers can fulfill their fiduci-
ary duties as well as the system of moni-
toring (and checking) them are needed. 
 
Although it is possible for each stake-
holder to monitor and check the fiduci-
ary duties of managers, the ability to 
monitor and check managers’ behavior is 
limited because there is an asymmetry of 
information as well as a wide gap in 
knowledge and capability (a wide gap in 
information processing ability) between 
managers and stakeholders. Therefore, 
independent auditor with independence 
and expertise plays an important role to 
complement the checking function of 
managers’ fiduciary duties, which are 
the core of corporate governance. Inde-
pendent auditing as statutory auditing 
also play an important role of a sort of 
public intervention. In doing so, inde-
pendent auditing can contribute to stake-
holders. Indeed, stakeholders bear some 
risks by being involved in corporate ac-
tivities and are highly interested in cor-
porate fraud and going concerns. Hence, 
stakeholders require independent audi-
tors’ active involvement in corporate 
fraud and going concern issue on the 
ground of many recent corporate mis-
deeds and scandals. Independent audit-
ing does not serve to reduce agency 
costs which inevitably arise from the 
agency relationship between managers 
and shareholders, but is publicly and 
legally expected to check and control the 
managers’ fiduciary duties. In fact, au-
diting, throughout history, has been a 
clearly recognized means of checking 
the fidelity of fiduciaries or entrustees 
(Brown, 1905), and therefore has its ob-
jective that serves essentially for corpo-
rate governance. 
 
The possible roles of independent audit-
ing in corporate governance (especially, 
the negative function) can be summed 
up as follows. 
 
1. Independent auditing enhances the 
credibility of financial statements. 
This role allows stakeholders to 
check the activities of managers 
based on audited financial state-
ments. In short, independent audit-
ing leads to supporting the functions 
of stakeholders’ governance in order 
to control the behaviors of manag-
ers. 
2. Independent auditing checks and 
controls the fiduciary duties of man-
agers, and performs the important 
function of governing managers. 
The following are some of the in-
volvements of independent auditing 
in the fiduciary duties of managers: 
a) Independent auditing is in-
volved in detecting and pre-
venting the fraud or illegal acts 
of managers. Detecting their 
fraud or illegal acts and pre-
venting them lead to the role of 
monitoring and controlling 
their fiduciary duties. Actually, 
independent auditing detects 
and prevents material misstate-
ments caused by fraud, errors, 
and illegal acts21. 
b) Independent auditing is in-
volved in corporate manage-
ment or administration. Manag-
ers are responsible for building, 
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using, and improving internal 
control22. Evaluating internal 
control over financial reports in 
independent auditing lead to 
the role of checking and con-
trolling the fiduciary duties of 
managers. These are actually 
performed in some practices23.  
c) Independent auditing is in-
volved in business risk which 
may suppress the continued 
progress of each corporation. It 
is managers’ responsibility to 
cope with various business 
risks and maintain their corpo-
rate brands24. Since auditors 
nowadays are involved in go-
ing concerns issue, they are 
involved in business risk in 
some sense. Independent audi-
tors’ active involvement in 
business risk increasingly leads 
to their role of checking and 
controlling the fiduciary duties 
of managers. 
d) Independent auditors indirectly 
control managers. Managers 
are more likely to fulfill their 
fiduciaries duties because they 
know that their fiduciary duties 
will be checked independently 
and objectively by Independent 
auditors. In other words, inde-
pendent auditing contributes to 
corporate governance by deter-
ring managers’ behaviors. 
3. Independent auditing contributes to 
rebuilding the relationship of trust 
between corporations and society. 
Independent auditing not only rein-
forces a fiduciary relationship be-
tween corporations and existing 
stakeholders by checking and con-
trolling the fiduciary duties of man-
agers but also helps expand to a fi-
duciary relationship between corpo-
rations and potential stakeholders. 
Independent auditing corrects man-
agers’ fraud, errors and illegal acts, 
and leads corporations in the right 
direction, thus functioning as a con-
troller of society. 
 
How independent auditing can contrib-
ute to corporate governance has been 
discussed. Corporate governance will 
clearly be reinforced by independent 
auditing. In this context, independent 
auditing plays an important role in cor-
porate governance in the true sense.  
 
In the future, we reexamine the existing 
objective and inherent limitation of inde-
pendent auditing and the existing scope 
of independent auditors’ responsibility in 
order to contribute to corporate govern-
ance from stakeholders’ perspective. 
 
3.3 Contribution of auditing system to 
corporate governance 
 
Since independent auditing alone has a 
limitation, it alone cannot adequately 
contribute to corporate governance. In 
order for independent auditing to con-
tribute to corporate governance effec-
tively, mutually complementary systems 
21
  In the future, in independent auditing, it is thought to 
be necessary to actively detect and prevent fraud, er-
rors, and illegal acts that will cause material misstate-
ment for stakeholders than detecting and preventing 
material misstatement by such fraud, errors, and illegal 
acts for shareholders. 
22
 COSO (1992) is very famous in the concept and 
definition of internal control. The discussion here is 
based on the internal control of the COSO. In addition, 
COSO ERM (Enterprise Risk Management-integrated 
Framework) was published at 2004.  
23
  In addition, auditing of internal control over finan-
cial reporting performs in conjunction with auditing of 
financial statements by same independent auditors (so -
called performance of an integrated auditing) in the 
U.S., the Grate Britain, France, South Korea, and Japan 
(from April 2008).  
24   For example, Japanese Auditing Standards actually 
include “serious deterioration of brand image” as busi-
ness risk information.  
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to independent auditing may be required. 
Such systems include Japanese corporate 
auditors (or audit committee)25 and inter-
nal auditing which play an important 
role in complementing independent 
auditing26. 
 
Today, it is necessary for Japanese cor-
porate auditors (Kansayaku) or audit 
committee to fulfill their duties with a 
basic viewpoint to the establishment and 
operation of the system of good corpo-
rate governance. And, it is desirable for 
corporate auditors or audit committee to 
prevent corporate misdeeds and scandals 
and to ensure and safeguard sustained 
growth and development of their corpo-
ration as their fundamental duties. The 
scope of auditing of corporate auditors is 
both auditing of directors’ performance 
(Gyoumu Kansa) and auditing of ac-
counting matters (Kaikei Kansa) (JCAA, 
2007a). The former is “audit of direc-
tor’s performance of duties”, “auditing 
of decision-making of board of direc-
tors”, “performance audit of the board of 
directors’ duty of supervision”, “audit of 
internal control system”, “audit of direc-
tors’ competitive transactions”, “auditing 
of business report etc.”, and “the status 
of performing the duties of outside cor-
porate auditors in the business report”. 
The latter is “auditing of accounting 
matters”, “system to ensure the appropri-
ate performance of the duties of inde-
pendent auditors”, “remuneration etc. of 
independent auditors”, “audit of ac-
counting policies, etc.”, “audit of finan-
cial statements”, and “election of inde-
pendent auditors, etc”. On the other 
hand, the scope of auditing of audit com-
mittee is both auditing of officers’ and 
directors’ performance and auditing of 
accounting matters (JCAA, 2007b). The 
former is “audit of officers’ performance 
of duties”, “audit of directors’ perform-
ance of duties”, “auditing of internal 
control system”, “audit of internal con-
trol over financial reports”, “auditing of 
discloser system”, “audit of officers’ and 
directors’ competitive transactions”, 
“auditing of business report etc.”, and 
“the status of performing the duties of 
outside audit commissioners in the busi-
ness report”. The latter is “auditing of 
accounting matters”, “system to ensure 
the appropriate performance of the du-
ties of independent auditors”, 
“remuneration etc. of independent audi-
tors”, “audit of accounting policies, 
etc.”, “audit of financial statements”, 
and “election of independent auditors, 
etc”. 
 
Furthermore, internal auditing has the 
functions of both auditing activities and 
consulting activities. Of course, internal 
auditors need to accomplish both audit-
ing activities and consulting activities in 
the main scope of activity which is risk 
management, control, and the process of 
governance (IIAJ, 2004). It is desirable 
that internal auditing is not only conven-
tional compliance auditing and risk-
based auditing but also the auditing de-
signed to verify the effectiveness of the 
25
  Japanese corporations can select either the traditional 
Japanese style of corporate governance mechanism (two
-tier board system: board of directors and board of cor-
porate auditors) or the new style of corporate govern-
ance mechanism (one-tier board system: the committee 
system) modeled on American style of corporate gov-
ernance mechanism (see Kurihama, 2005 for details). 
Although there are some opinions that the committee 
system works on corporate governance, it is very impor-
tant for each Japanese corporation to adopt the structure 
of corporate governance fitting for each corporate phi-
losophy and culture. This paper basically focuses on 
corporate auditors adopted by large majority of Japa-
nese corporations. According to a survey of JCAA , the 
number of Japanese corporations which adopt the com-
mittee system is 110 corporations (include listed and 
unlisted corporations) as of 11 December 2007. 
26
  Conversely, corporate auditors (or audit committee) 
or internal auditing alone cannot adequately contribute 
to fulfilling CSR and corporate governance. 
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process of risk management, control sys-
tem, and governance as its mission. 
 
Each auditing, which is independent au-
diting, corporate auditors (or audit com-
mittee) and internal auditing, plays an 
important role in corporate governance, 
and is mutually complementary relation-
ship. For example, the Cadbury report 
(1992) and the Hampel report (1998) in 
U. K., EC Green Paper (1996), auditing 
studies (JAA, 2003 etc.) in Japan and so 
on recommended that independent audit-
ing strengthen collaboration with audit 
committee (corporate auditors in Japan) 
to enhance the governance function of 
independent auditing for shareholders. 
However, until now, each auditing have 
not effectively cooperated and ade-
quately interacted with each other as one 
auditing system, particularly for stake-
holders. 
 
Consequently, when independent audit-
ing, corporate auditors (or audit commit-
tee), and internal auditing effectively 
cooperate and adequately interact with 
each other as one auditing system not for 
shareholders but for stakeholders, it will 
be possible to contribute to corporate 
governance effectively. To this end, it is 
necessary to structure one auditing sys-
tem by reconsidering the roles of each 
auditing involved so that they can con-
tribute to corporate governance more 
effectively as one auditing system (or 
auditing network) (Figure1). By doing 
so, corporate governance will drastically 
be reinforced. 
 
In the future, human resource develop-
ment from viewpoint of independence 
and expertise in auditing (especially, 
corporate auditors, the members of audit 
committee, and internal auditors) is one 
of important issues in order for auditing 
system to function effectively. More-
over, it will be necessary to examine the 
optimum form of independent auditing, 
and eventually the optimum form of one 
auditing system including corporate 
auditors (or audit committee) and inter-
nal auditing. On the other hand, corpora-
tions need to increasingly support audit-
ing system because it plays very impor-
tant role in corporate governance if they 
want to restore public trust. 
Figure1: Contribution of auditing system to corporate governance 
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4. Conclusion 
 
A conventional perspective on the rela-
tionship between corporate governance 
and independent auditing is discussed 
widely from shareholders’ perspective. 
Under such view, independent auditing 
plays an important role in checking 
whether managers maximize the interest 
of shareholders by enhancing the credi-
bility of financial statements presented 
to shareholders by managers. Therefore, 
independent auditing contributes to 
shareholders, and supports the agency 
relationship between managers and 
shareholders. However, we can no 
longer accept uncritically a conventional 
perspective on the relationship between 
corporate governance and independent 
auditing.  
 
From the foregoing discussion, we can 
understand that it is necessary to think 
the relationship between corporate gov-
ernance and independent auditing from 
stakeholders’ perspective. Today’s inde-
pendent auditing needs to play an impor-
tant role in checking managers’ fiduci-
ary duties for stakeholders. In doing so, 
independent auditing can contribute to 
stakeholders. In other words, independ-
ent auditing needs to contribute to not 
supporting the good relationship be-
tween managers and shareholders but 
supporting the good relationship be-
tween corporation and stakeholders. In 
this context, independent auditing is an 
essential element of today’s corporate 
governance. This is a new perspective 
on the relationship between today’s cor-
porate governance and independent au-
diting. 
 
In addition, since independent auditing 
alone has a limitation, independent au-
diting, auditing of corporate auditors (or 
audit committee), and internal auditing 
need to effectively cooperate and ade-
quately interact with each other as one 
auditing system in order to contribute to 
corporate governance more effectively. 
In order for one auditing system to con-
tribute to corporate governance in the 
true sense, it is necessary to for us to 
reconsider one auditing system as corpo-
rate auditing based on the question, 
“What does an auditing system bring to 
society?”, and to find a new view of un-
derstanding auditing system through the 
discussion of today’s CSR. Based on the 
foregoing discussion, the analytical do-
main of auditing system is presented in 
Figure 227. Independent auditing as well 
as corporations as public institutions of 
society needs to contribute to public 
trust. In the future, corporations need to 
increasingly support each auditing be-
cause auditing system plays an impor-
tant role in corporate governance. More-
over, managers need to position each 
auditing as contribution to corporate 
governance, and as not a “cost” but an 
“investment” in sustained corporate de-
velopment.  
 
In a true sense, auditing as social control 
is a medium to ensure the good relation-
ship between corporations and stake-
holders. Auditing is a social infrastruc-
ture to build up public trust as a social 
capital, and is indispensable presence for 
stakeholders and corporation. Stake-
holders and corporation need to have a 
better understanding of the importance 
of auditing in corporate governance. 
When stakeholders, corporation, and 
auditing effectively cooperate and ade-
quately interact with each other and gen-
erate a synergistic effect, they are able to 
build up a better society. 
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